Nothing is more confusing than to examine, side by side, Merleau-Ponty's late writings with Derrida's early writing; it almost seems as though we are reading the same philosopher. Most obviously, the confusion arises because, in the decade from the late Fifties to the late Sixties, there is a massive terminological and thematic overlap between, say, Merleau-Ponty's 1961 The Visible and the Invisible and Derrida's 1967 Voice and Phenomenon ; indeed, most of this overlap centers around one word, the French word, "écart." The confusion is exacerbated by the fact that this overlap occurs precisely when Merleau-Ponty's career comes to an end and Derrida's is just at its beginning. When, however, Derrida matures and becomes Derrida, the confusion seems to dissipate. No one would think, for example, that Merleau-Ponty had written this strange thing called Glas. Here at last, in 1974 (when Glas is published), one can say easily that there is no confusion between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. But, Derrida himself brings the confusion back in his 1990 Memoirs of the Blind when he himself suggests "a program for an entire rereading of the later Merleau-Ponty." Derrida says that, if he were to pursue this re-reading of Merleau-Ponty, he would follow the traces of "absolute invisibility," a "pure transcendence without an ontic face." This last phrase comes from a working note to The Visible and the Invisible dated January 1960, in which Merleau-Ponty also says: "Elaborate a phenomenology of 'the other world,' as the limit of a phenomenology of the imaginary and the hidden." We know, especially now, that this phrase – "the limit of a phenomenology" – refers to a lecture course Merleau-Ponty presented in 1959-60 called "Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology," a lecture course concerning Husserl's last writings but especially his "The Origin of Geometry." The publication of these notes in 1998 makes the confusion between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida even more overwhelming, since here Merleau-Ponty stresses that the constitution of ideal objects takes place through writing, just as Derrida had stressed it in his 1962 Introduction to his French translation of "The Origin of Geometry." In fact, while reading these two texts together, one has the experience that Merleau-Ponty sounds more like Derrida than Derrida does in the Introduction. The question now is obvious: are we supposed to think, now, in light of these "new" Notes, that Derrida's philosophy somehow continues that of Merleau-Ponty?
In light of these Notes, I think we have to answer this question with a "yes." Indeed, it seems to me that the confusion of the two philosophers is justified. Despite appearances – Merleau-Ponty as the philosopher of speech; Derrida as the philosopher of writing – despite appearances, this difference between speech and writing does not absolutely determine the relation between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. In short, this difference is not decisive. At almost the exact same moment, in the late Fifties, Derrida and Merleau-Ponty have stumbled upon the same structure of experience, and, most generally, we can call this structure the structure of the experience of intersubjectivity. What we call this structure – speech or writing – is not decisive. Both, of course, use other terms to designate it. From the Phenomenology of Perception on, it is called the Fundierung relation (PHP147-48/127; 451-52/394); from Voice and Phenomenon on, it is called différance. But, in the Notes Merleau-Ponty appropriates another Husserlian term besides Fundierung to designate this structure; this appropriation is decisive: he appropriates the exact term Derrida will appropriate in Voice and Phenomenon: Verflectung (interweaving, entrelacement) (VP 20/20). Merleau-Ponty says: "True Husserlian thought: man, world, language are interwoven, verflochten. A thick identity exists there, which truly contains difference" (HL 50; also HL 45). Nothing could sound more Derridean.
So, what I intend to do today, most basically, is compare Merleau-Ponty Notes and Derrida's Introduction in order to demonstrate the continuity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida and thereby to justify the confusion that usually surrounds their relation. In fact, I hope to demonstrate that there is an exact point of continuity between them; this exact point of continuity, as we are going to see, lies in a certain concept of necessity. If there is this exact point of continuity, in a certain concept of necessity, then I think we can say that Merleau-Ponty's spirit lives on in Derrida, even in Derrida's most recent writings; perhaps we have to say that Merleau-Ponty eventually could have, would have written a book like Glas. But, we can go even farther. If this heritage that I am going to lay out between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida is correct, then one has to say, as well, that Husserl's spirit lives on in Merleau-Ponty's final writing and even in Derrida's most recent writings. We have to say that Merleau-Ponty at the end of his career, when he is ontologizing phenomenology, is still faithful to Husserl, and we have to say that Derrida, even in his eschatological writings like the 1993 Specters of Marx, is still faithful to Husserl. But again, most basically, what I intend to do today is work out a comparison of Merleau-Ponty's Notes on, and Derrida's Introduction to, Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry." The exact point of continuity comes from "The Origin of Geometry." So, let us now turn to these two texts.
1. The Necessity of Stiftung: Writing
Both Merleau-Ponty's 1960 Notes and Derrida 1962 Introduction concern what Husserl himself calls "Stiftung," institution, establishment, or foundation (HUS 366/354). On the one hand, Derrida says in section 10 of his Introduction:
This is how the motif of finitude has perhaps more affinity with the principle of a phenomenology which would be stretched between the finitizing consciousness of its principle [that is, the principle of all principles] and the infinitizing consciousness of its final foundation [that is, the Idea in the Kantian sense; fondement], the "Endstiftung" indefinitely deferred [differée] in its content, but always evident in its regulative value. (LOG 151/138; Derrida's italics).
Here, with Stiftung, we have Derrida's earliest use of the verb "différer." So, we can say that the Husserlian problem of Stiftung is the context for Derrida developing his most famous concept, that of "différance." But, on the other hand, Merleau-Ponty says in his Notes that:
Stiftung is not an envelopping thought, but open thought, not the intended and Vorhabe of the actual center, but the intended which is off center and which will be rectified, not the positing of an end, but the positing of a style, not frontal grasp, but lateral divergence, algae brought up from the depths. (HL 30; Merleau-Ponty's underlining; cf. also HL 31).
Here, with Stiftung, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the divergence. So, again, we can say that the Husserlian problem of Stiftung is the context for Merleau-Ponty developing his most famous final concept: the écart which is the basis for the chiasm. But, more importantly, the problem of Stiftung implies that both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida develop their basic concepts as concepts of writing. Merleau-Ponty in the Notes and Derrida in the Introduction recognize that writing is necessary for Stiftung.
Everyone knows that Husserl, in "The Origin of Geometry," discusses documentation and thus "writing-down" (Niederschrift); "writing-down" is the last step in the original institution of geometrical ideal objects. If we can speak of steps here, there are two prior steps: internal subjective iteration and then linguistic expression in the community of the inventor. Finally, there is documentation; this is what Husserl says, and for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, this is the most important thing Husserl says in "The Origin of Geometry":
Now we must note that the objectivity of the ideal structure has not yet been fully constituted through such actual transferring of what has been originally produced in one to others who originally reproduce it. What is lacking is the persisting existence of the "ideal objects" even during periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer wakefully so connected or even are no longer alive. What is lacking is their continuing-to-be even when no one has realized them in self-evidence. The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual. (HUS 371/360).
As both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida recognize, this comment means that writing is necessary in order for an ideal object to be fully constituted, in other words, to be what it is (HL 30; cf. PHP 206/177; LOG 86/89); Derrida in the Introduction calls it an "eidetic necessity" (LOG 17n1/36). Thus, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, "the written" – Merleau-Ponty uses the word "l'écrit" (HL 28) – or "writing" – Derrida uses the word "l'écriture" (LOG 84/87) – is not a mere "substitute" for or a "degradation" of the sense (HL 29); it is not merely "congealed speech" (HL 78); it is not mere transmission or communication (HL 29, 78); nor is the writing-down mere "abbreviations," "codification," "signs," or "clothing" (HL 70; LOG 86/89). It is not a "defect" (HL 69), nor is it a merely "worldly and mnemotechnical aid" (LOG 86/89). The passage above – and I think this is crucial – implies all of these negative characterizations of writing because in it Husserl says "something is lacking" (es fehlt); the necessity of writing down comes from this lack in the "ideal structure"; the lack – here is the necessity – needs to be filled in.
Husserl points to this need of filling in, when, in "The Origin of Geometry," he says, "the writing-down effects a transformation of the original mode of being of the sense-structure" (HUS 371/361). Most obviously, and of course both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida note this in their texts, the transformation of the ontological status of the sense-structure means that writing endows the sense-structure with the characteristic of being "non-spatio-temporal" (LOG 88/90) or "supratemporal" (HL 24); this supratemporality or omnitemporality is the persisting existence mentioned above, "their continuing-to-be even when no one has realized them in self-evidence." Prior to the achievement of omnitemporality, the sense-structure is too subjective (or transient) and not objective enough (or permanent). Merleau-Ponty, for example, calls the sense-structure an "intra-psychic event" (HL 53). However, just as prior to the transformation, the sense-structure is too subjective, after the transformation, when the sense-structure has achieved omnitemporality, it is too objective. As Merleau-Ponty says, it becomes a "monument" (HL 78), or, as Derrida says, it becomes a "lapidary inscription" (LOG 85/88). But, the transformation of the ontological status of the sense-structure into omnitemporality does not mean, for Husserl, of course, that the sense-structure, now ideal object, exists outside of time; as Derrida says, quoting Experience and Judgment, "'supratemporality implies omnitemporality,' and the latter itself [is] only 'a mode of temporality'" (LOG 165/148). So, when writing effects a transformation of the ontological mode of the sense-structure, it also makes the ideal object "sensible" and "public," as Merleau-Ponty says (HL 69, 78); it comes "into the world" (HL 69); or, as Derrida says, it is "incarnated," "localized and temporalized" (LOG 86/89). So, as both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida see, the necessity of writing down must be "double" (HL 37) – this is Merleau-Ponty's word, sounding like Derrida – or "ambiguous" – this is Derrida's word, sounding like Merleau-Ponty (LOG 84/87). So far then, we have seen that the necessity of writing is based in a lack which needs – this need is the source of the necessity – which needs to be filled in. And, we have seen that this lack is double: sense lacks objectivity which produces a need to go beyond subjective experience, and sense lacks subjectivity which produces a need to go beyond ideal objectivity. In other word, on the one hand, sense must be written down in order to be omnitemporal, in order to exceed subjective experience; on the other hand, sense must be written down in order to be temporal, in order to make itself available to subjective experience. In short, the writing down turns the sense-structure into sedimentation (HL 29; LOG 92/93). The mention of sedimentation, of course, conjures up the image of survival. So, let us examine this survival.
2. The Necessity of Survival: Negativity
Because Husserl in "The Origin of Geometry" says that ideal object "lack persisting existence," both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida claim that writing is necessary in a double sense, in order to assure this persisting existence and in order to make this persisting existence available for others. This double necessity implies that the sense structure survives in a double sense, as if it were dead body and as if it were super-alive. Now, in the Notes, Merleau-Ponty specifies the lack of persisting existence as a "negativity" (HL 22, 33, 37), and he quotes Heidegger speaking of "the nothing that nothings" (HL 64). As Heidegger says in "What is Metaphysics?", the nothing that nothings is not a "nullity." If it were a nullity, it would only be the counter-concept to Being, and therefore itself would depend on negation. The Heideggerian nothing, however, is not derived from negation but is the origin of negation. Negation originates in the nothing insofar as it is an experience, the experience of anxiety, and, obviously, given what we know about division two of Being and Time, we are still talking of death. Yet, since this experience of the nothing is an experience, we must say that the nothing is actually a sort of positivity, a something, an Etwas, as Heidegger says. Thus, for Heidegger, the nothing is internal to Being; in fact, without this experience of anxiety we would, for Heidegger, have no access to the Being of beings. Clearly influenced by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty engages in a similar discussion of negativity in The Visible and the Invisible, in particular in the chapter entitled "Interrogation and Dialectic" where Merleau-Ponty is engaging in a debate with Sartre. What is most clear in this chapter is that Merleau-Ponty is concerned to distinguish this negativity from a pure nothingness, from what Heidegger called a nullity: Wholly positive being and pure nothingness are at least solidary if not indiscernible because they both revolve around a negation which makes them be counter-concepts. As in Heidegger therefore, Merleau-Ponty's negativity is a negativity which is within Being; it is the "true negative," and thus it is, as Merleau-Ponty says frequently in The Visible and the Invisible, "something" (VI 121/89).
So, Merleau-Ponty, in The Visible and the Invisible and in the Notes, defines this lack as a "hollow" (HL 22, 33, 51, 57; VI 196/281/227); unlike the well-known Sartrean "hole of being" which suggests a void over and against a fullness, which in other words, suggests counter-concepts and opposition, the Merleau-Pontean hollow suggests an opening within a something, in a something which is not opposed to the hollow (VI 249-50/196). In the Notes and in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty defines the hollow as Nichturpräsentierbarkeit, "originary non-presentability" (HL 28, 83, 86; VI 292/238-39). Merleau-Ponty's "originary non-presentability" is referring to an essential aspect of intersubjective experience learned from Husserl, that is, that I can never have the interior life of another present for me. In the Notes, Merleau-Ponty adds to this essential aspect of intersubjective experience by stressing that the non-presentability of the other to me is a kind of muteness; this muteness, however, does not mean that the other is not speaking because he or she is dumb. There is always, for Merleau-Ponty, a background of language, the ready-made or spoken language, within which the muteness lies, but this muteness is still the origin of language (HL 53). Here, I think it is important to recall that Merleau-Ponty had defined expression in the Phenomenology of Perception in terms of the phrase "mettre en forme" (PHP 220/189). The Merleau-Pontean silence therefore is a thought, but one which is "gestaltlos," as Merleau-Ponty says (HL 58), "formless," and as formless, it is not nothing but rather something which needs – "which calls from itself" – expression.
As in Merleau-Ponty's later writings, in Derrida's Introduction, there is a continuous theme of negativity (LOG 17n1/17); the prefix "non" appears countless times there (LOG 112/109). We know from Voice and Phenomenon that Derrida associates this negativity with Heidegger, and, like Heidegger, he uses "nothing" as a substantive (VI 12/12). The substantive use of "rien" implies that, here in Derrida as we saw in Merleau-Ponty, we do not have a pure nothingness. Nevertheless, in the Introduction, Derrida, unlike Merleau-Ponty, determines the lack of persisting existence which necessitates survival, and thus determines this negativity, when he analyzes Husserl's discussion of idealization in "The Origin of Geometry" (HUS 375/365). What is important for Derrida is that Husserl says that "The peculiar sort of self-evidence belonging to such idealizations will concern us later." Husserl, of course, never returns to it. So, for Derrida, the question is: is there any evidence for such idealizations? The idealization of which Husserl is speaking is the breakthrough of a sense towards "an Idea in the Kantian sense," (LOG 147/135). But, as soon as we understand that an Idea in the Kantian sense means infinity, we know that the sense cannot be given in evidence (LOG 147/134-35, 152/139). Evidence, being given in person, is always finite. So, for Derrida, this evidence, if we can still call it that, is formal; or perhaps better, this experience is the experience of formality. We can have evidence only of the form of infinity but not its content; we have no evidence of infinity itself (LOG 152-53/139). In other words, what is lacking and what then brings about a need for survival in Derrida is not formless content (as in Merleau-Ponty) but rather contentless form. In Derrida, the need for survival comes from a formalization without content. What we have is a finite form which needs indefinitely to become fulfilled.
In the Introduction, Derrida speaks of the Idea in the Kantian sense as having "its own original presence" (LOG 152/139); but, we know that, by the time of Voice and Phenomenon, this "original presence" will be called "non-presence" (VP 5/6, 71/63). It is especially clear in Voice and Phenomenon that this Derridean "non-presence" derives from the experience of the other, since Derrida claims that Husserl's "solitary life of the soul" in the First Investigation anticipates "the sphere of ownness" in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation; thus Derrida's "non-presence" resembles Merleau-Ponty's Nichturpräsentierbarkeit, insofar as both concepts derive from the essential aspect of the experience of the other, that the other's interior life is not directly present to me, but only appresented to me. Yet, what Derrida is implying in both the Introduction and in Voice and Phenomenon is that, when I have an appresentation of the other, what I have is the form of the other and not its content; this lack of content is what makes the other other for Derrida and it also keeps the form of the other indefinitely open to fulfillment.
Before we turn to the third and last section, I am going to summarize what we have seen so far. On the basis of what Husserl says in "The Origin of Geometry" about the institution of ideal objects requiring writing because the sense structure "lacks" "persisting existence," both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida assert a double necessity, the necessity of going beyond subjective experience in order to be objective and the necessity of going beyond ideal objectivity in order to be available to subjective experience. By focusing on the crystallizing images of the grimoire in Merleau-Ponty and the entombment of lost intentions in Derrida, we were able to see that this double necessity implies a certain concept of sur-vival, beyond life, that is, death; and beyond death, that is, life. Then we focused only on the first side of this concept of survival. Going beyond life implies a negativity. Here, in the discussion of negativity, we first discovered a similarity – Merleau-Ponty's "originary non-presentability" looks to be the same as Derrida's "non-presence" – then we discovered a difference – perhaps the difference between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty – for Merleau-Ponty, the negativity of writing is a formless content, while, for Derrida, the negativity of writing, is a contentless form. Nevertheless, we are still able to see the exact point of continuity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida since, for both, the negativity of writing, that the author must die, is, as Merleau-Ponty says, "a call to reiteration" (HL 66) and, as Derrida says, "a first posting" (LOG 36/50). In other words, the negativity of writing implies that writing is always, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, defined by the dative case: it is a sending to. But, with the dative, we turn now to the other side of the necessity, that the object must become subjective.
3. The Necessity of Negativity: Faith
In the Notes, Merleau-Ponty indeed defines speech as "speaking to" (HL 71). He defines speech in this way because he is trying to understand language that is not "ready-made" but language "in the making." Here, Merleau-Ponty, of course, is utilizing a distinction that he developed in earlier works, and I've already referred to it: the well-known distinction between "speaking speech" and "spoken speech" (PHP 229/197). In fact, he uses these exact terms in the Notes (HL 53). While speaking speech is "ready-made" language – a language someone has spoken – speaking speech is language in the making (HL 67, 56, 52, 49) – a language I am speaking (HL 49). Therefore, speaking speech is a praxis; Merleau-Ponty says, "Speech is a praxis: the only way to understand speech is to speak (to speak to or be interpellated by)" (HL 67). This being interpellated by – someone is interrogating "to" me -needs a response. Merleau-Ponty defines the response to interpellation in terms of what Husserl calls Nachverstehen in "The Origin of Geometry" (HUS 371/360; HL 27; cf. PHP 208n2/179n2). In the dative relation of hearing – when someone is questioning "to" me – I always encounter the "Nicthurpräsentierbarkeit" of the other. Because Nachverstehen encounters the limit of that which cannot be re-animated – the negativity of death – Nachverstehen is, for Merleau-Ponty, first a kind of passivity (HL 63). In the Notes, Merleau-Ponty says that geometrical ideality "calls me to" Nachverstehen (HL 35, 66). Thus, in order to hear this call, I must be quiet; obviously, if someone is interrogating (to) me, I must listen. So, the passivity of Nachverstehen must be conceived as mute. But again, this muteness does not, for Merleau-Ponty, mean a lack of language; it does not mean that I am dumb. In fact, I have the ready-made forms of spoken speech available to me.
Yet, it is precisely this specific silence of expression that makes Nachverstehen be active. Precisely because Nachverstehen encounters the limit of non-presentability – precisely because it is passive – it must be active. In Nach-verstehen, there is an activity of repeating – the Nach – which makes that hearing is not mere "receptivity" (HL 55, 63); Nachverstehen works with passivity, Merleau-Ponty says. This working with passivity makes Nachverstehen be, for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of Deckung, recouvrement, coincidence (HL 65). But here, coincidence does not mean that all of a sudden I have access to your thoughts. Instead, when I listen and understand your question, again, Nach, what I am doing is actualizing virtualities: ideality, as Merleau-Ponty says, "appears at the edge of speech" (HL 57, 27-28). When someone is interrogating (to) me, he or she is expressing an ideality in the ready-made forms of spoken speech. But, since I do not have access to the soul of the other – his or her soul is not-presentable, even, so to speak, dead – then the expressed ideality is separated from this person. It is at the "pivot" (HL 27, 29, 77) between us. Thus, when I listen and then respond, I repeat the ideality. But also, since I have only the ideality and not its "soul," I must create an other "side" of the ideality. The silence of my listening must be put into a form and this form will be derived from the ready-made forms. But when I put my silence into the linguistic form, this insertion recreates the sense. For Merleau-Ponty, Nachverstehen is Nacherzeugung. In other words, with Merleau-Ponty, every time I understand again, I institute again; in other words, every re-understanding is a recommencement; every re-understanding is another beginning.
In the Notes, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes what Husserl calls "Nachverstehen" from what he calls "reactivation"; reactivation, for Merleau-Ponty, aims at reactivating everything (HL 29, 28, 83). This comment means that reactivation aims at being entirely active; it does not work with the passivity. The passivity that defines Nachverstehen is why Merleau-Ponty says that Nachverstehen is not a "survey" (HL 55). We know this word "survol" from The Visible and the Invisible; to survey is to soar over and thereby dominate (VI 109/177), and Merleau-Ponty even defines survoler in The Visible and the Invisible, as "reactivating all the sedimented thoughts" (VI 150/112). But, if Nachverstehen is not une pensée en survol, then we know that it is what Merleau-Ponty as early as the Phenomenology of Perception and as late as The Visible and the Invisible calls "originary faith." The word "faith" does not occur in Merleau-Ponty's Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," but it seems to me that Nachverstehen substitutes for it. Indeed, in the Notes, Merleau-Ponty speaks of a "knowledge of non-knowledge" which suggests faith (HL 21-22, 24, 33). For Merleau-Ponty, when I respond to the interpellation, or, better, to the interrogation, I must have faith in the one who is speaking to me; I do not know what the person is asking of me, since I cannot soar over his or her thoughts; he or she is a ghostly presence. But also, I must have faith in myself; I do not know what I am going to say since it lies in silence, formless; I am a ghostly self-presence.
This language of ghosts, of course, refers to Derrida, but it seems legitimate to introduce it into Merleau-Ponty because Derrida develops the concept of specter in conjunction with a concept of faith. Retrospectively, we can see that Derrida's early writings were going in the direction of faith even though they do not contain a theme of faith. It is possible to see now that, in the Introduction, when Derrida is speaking of the "strange presence" of the Idea in the Kantian sense, this strange presence implies a kind of ghostly presence and thus calls for faith. Moreover, at the conclusion of Voice and Phenomenon, when Derrida says, "As for what 'begins' then 'beyond' absolute knowledge, unheard-of thoughts are required" (VP 115/102; Derrida's emphasis), we now know that this "beyond absolute knowledge" is a kind of faith. Most basically, as in Merleau-Ponty, faith in Derrida is a dative relation. In both the Introduction and Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida emphasizes the dative relation: in Husserl, language or the logos or form, as Derrida says, is always "relation to the object" (VP 110/98; LOG 153/139). Thus, as in Merleau-Ponty, in Derrida the logos interrogates (to) me and "demands" a response (cf. LOG 162/146).
One of the most remarkable things about Derrida Introduction is that it contains an explicit theme of responsibility. Given the necessity of death, we know that responsibility in Derrida must be defined by "bringing the sense to life" (LOG 100-01/99). But as soon as we recognize that responsibility is a kind of conjuring up of ghosts, then we have to see that responsibility is a kind of faith. When I hear a word or read a text, this logos always indicates a non-presence, which eliminates the possibility of absolute knowledge; as in Merleau-Ponty, responsibility in Derrida is not une pensée en survol. But, while responsibility is a kind of faith in the other that I have resurrected, responsibility is also a kind of faith in myself. I must be the one who can do this; as Derrida says, "I restore [the sense's] dependence in regard to my own act and reproduce it in me" (LOG 100-01/99; my emphasis). I am the one selected, on whom the sense depends. The dependence of sense on me is how Derrida defines responsibility in the last section of the Introduction (LOG 166/149). Most generally, however, in the Introduction, Derrida defines responsibility as "fulfillment" (LOG 11/31). Clearly, this word means the completion, even the ending of the sense in presence. But, since the sense is always infinite as an Idea in the Kantian sense, my response which fulfills the question asked to me does not and cannot ever completely fulfill it. The sense is always necessarily open to an indefinite number of fulfillments, completions or ends. I must always fulfill this request, that is, end it, over and over again.
Both the discourse of the end that we find in Derrida and the discourse of beginning that we find in Merleau-Ponty derive from Heidegger. Indeed, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, the limit of Husserlian phenomenology lies in Heideggerian ontology, precisely, in Heidegger's conception of negativity. For Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger's negativity is the limit of phenomenology, insofar as phenomenology seems to be a positivism (HL 57, 64). But, unlike Merleau-Ponty, Derrida sees a limit of phenomenology in negativity because phenomenology is a "a philosophy of seeing" (LOG 155/141), an "intuitionism" (VP 110/98). But, if the limit of phenomenology, for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, lies in Heidegger's negativity, then we must say that what is most important in Heidegger for both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida is Heidegger's remembrance of the question of Being, which implies that Being itself must be defined as a question. It is this conception of Being as a question that is the guiding idea for Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible; but it is also the guiding idea for all of Derrida's texts from the Sixties. At this point, in the Sixties, the confusion between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty is remarkable. Yet, already in "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida has the seeds for a eliminating this confusion: when he speaks there of the community of the question, Derrida also speaks of an "injunction" of the question. This injunction implies that a command precedes the question. Because of this prior command, Derrida, in his 1987 De l'esprit, will question Heidegger's priority of the question; for Derrida now, prior to the question of Being is the command of a promise; it is a deathbed promise: "promise me that you will survive!" The response to this command, which is no longer an answer to a question, is faith, faith in the one making me promise and faith in me, the one who must keep the promise sometime in the future. It seems to me that even here, when Derrida departs from the Heideggerian question for the promise, Merleau-Ponty's spirit survives in him. Because Merleau-Ponty takes up the theme of writing in the Notes on "The Origin of Geometry," we can perhaps predict that Merleau-Ponty, following the logic of death that writing implies, would have eventually transformed the question into the promise; this prediction seems especially reliable if we recall that Merleau-Ponty ends his 1952 candidacy abstract for the Collège de France by speaking of the establishment of an ethics.
1 This essay extends a previous essay on Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: "Eliminating Some Confusion: The Relation of Being and Writing in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida," in Ecart and Difference: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997): 71-93.
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l'invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964); English translation by Alphonso Lingis as The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).
3 Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phenomene (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967); English translation by David B. Allison as Speech and Phenomena (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).
4 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs d'aveugle (Paris: Editions de la Reunion des musees nationaux, 1990), p. 56; English translation by Pacale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas as Memoirs of the Blind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 51-52; Derrida's italics.
5 See Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l'invisible, p. 283; The Visible and the Invisible, p. 229; my italics.
6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours sur L'origine de la geometrie de Husserl suivi de Recherches sur la phenomenologie de Merleau-Ponty, sous la direction de R. Barbaras (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998); English translation forthcoming by Leonard Lawlor with Bettina Bergo as Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology Including Texts by Edmund Husserl (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, probable Spring 2001). All page references will be to the French edition using the abbreviation HL. Edmund Husserl, L'origine de la geometrie, Traduction et introduction par Jacques Derrida (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962); English translation by John P. Leavey as Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). All references to this text will be made first to the original French, then to the English translation with the abbreviation LOG.
7For the importance of the experience of the other in Merleau-Ponty, see Renaud Barbaras, De l'etre du phenomene: l'ontologie de Merleau-Ponty (Grenoble: Millon, 1992); English translation forthcoming as The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology by Theodore Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor for Prometheus Press. What is most remarkable about Derrida's Introduction, when one compares it to his earlier 1953-54 Memoire called The Problem of Genesis in Husserl Philosophy, is that the Introduction frequently discusses intersubjectivity (LOG 83n1/86n90; cf. LOG 129n2/121n134, 46/57-58, 49-50/60-61). This interest in the experience of intersubjectivity will only intensify for Derrida especially after his 1964 encounter with Levinas in "Violence and Metaphysics," and, as a result of this encounter, he interest dominates Voice and Phenomenon. See Jacques Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique," in L'écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967); English translation by Alan Bass as "Violence and Metaphysics," in Writing and Difference (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).
8 Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx. Paris: Galilee, 1993. English translation by Peggy Kamuf as Specters of Marx. New York: Routledge, 1994.
9 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945); English translation by Colin Smith, revised by Forrest Williams as Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). Hereafter referred to as PHP with reference first to the original French, then to the English translation.
10 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours 1959-1961 (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), pp. 102-03.
11 Martin Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?", in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 105, 115-16; English translation by David F. Krell as "What is Metaphysics?" in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 95, 105.
12 See Merleau-Ponty, Notes de Cours, 1959-61, p. 102, where Merleau-Ponty alludes to Heidegger discussion of the Etwas in Der Satz vom Grund.
13 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Signes, p. 30; Signs, p. 21.
14 Merleau-Ponty, Signes, p. 56; Signs, pp. 44-45. See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La prose du monde (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 17; English translation by John O'Neill as The Prose of the World (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 10.
15 Merleau-Ponty also uses some other terms: "spoken speech" is also called "ready-made language" (HL 53, 56, 67), "secondary language" (HL 56), or "ontic or empirical speech" (HL 57), and "speaking speech" is also called "operative language" (HL 63), "full or originary speech" (HL 56), or "ontological language" (HL 52-53).
16 It is at this point – at the point of ghostly presence – that one could make the transition to what Merleau-Ponty, in the Notes, calls "vertical being" (HL 61) and "the paradox of the horizon" (HL 43).
17 Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours, 1959-1961, pp. 103, 114-15. The connection between Heidegger and Bergson is crucial for the determination of Merleau-Ponty's final philosophy. It seems to me that this connection may be the most original thing Merleau-Ponty ever did. If this were our project, we could, in light of this connection between Bergson and Heidegger, establish a different Merleau-Ponty than the one we are establishing now; we could establish a Merleau-Ponty which goes not in the direction of Derrida, but in the direction of Deleuze
18 Derrida, L'Écriture et la différence, p. 118; Writing and Difference, p. 80.
19 Derrida, L'Écriture et la différence, p. 119; Writing and Difference, p. 80.
20 Jacques Derrida, De l'esprit (Paris: Galilee, 1987), pp. 36, 87, 59; English translation by Geoff Bennington and Rachel Bowlby as Of Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989), pp. 17, 56, 35.
21 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Un inédit de Maurice Merleau-Ponty," in Revue de métaphysique et de morale, no. 4 (1962), p. 409; English translation by Arleen B. Dallery as "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of his Work," in The Primacy of Perception, ed., James Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 11.